Conflict resolution strategy pdf

Deep down, we know that this conflict resolution approach usually fails to resolve the conflict and often only makes it worse. The power of listening the other party can make negotiating easy and gave trust to deal with,interest of every one should be clerarly defined about the goal and the issue of negotiation.

Great advice! I especially like 1 and 3 above for their simplicity and broad applicability to different types of disputes. Useful tips. I really like 1 and 3, finding similarities really help to build a stronger relationship between two people.

Click here to cancel reply. Your email address will not be published. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Preparing for Negotiation Understanding how to arrange the meeting space is a key aspect of preparing for negotiation. This discussion was held at the 3 day executive education workshop for senior executives at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. Behind all of this, the problem of imputation can be seen to be a deep and questionable one.

On the other hand, there undoubtedly is exploitation and injustice, much of which is institutionalized and also culturally and psy- chologically internalized. The exploiters may even be as unaware as anyone else of the overall situation and, indeed, genuinely believe that there is no injustice. They can also take long periods of time to gestate unnoticed before they suddenly erupt into overt violence. They cannot be undertaken sequentially as may be possible in escalation phases — see chapters 5 and 8.

We suggest that what is sometimes called deep peacemaking which includes reconciliation is best seen as part of cultural peacebuilding. Figure 1. And in chapters 8—10 Postwar Reconstruction; Peacebuilding; Reconciliation we will look at the bottom half of the hourglass model.

Table 1. It is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited con- straints. It is possible to change habitual responses and exercise intelligent choices. But this is not the only possible response.

Another alterna- tive is to yield: this implies more concern for the interests of Other than Self. Yet another is to balance concern for the interests of Self and Other, leading to a search for accommodation and compromise. The possible outcomes are seen to be win—lose one wins, the other loses or compromise they split their difference. But by then positions may be so entrenched, passions so strongly aroused, and intransigent leaders so strongly ensconced that change nevertheless proves impossible.

Any point towards the right is better for Abel, any point towards the top is better for Cain. All the other possibilities lie on the line from 1 to 2 in which the Lord divides his favour, more or less equally, between the two brothers.

Point 3 represents a possible compromise position. Two players prisoners accused of crime each have two choices: to cooperate with each other remain silent or to defect inform on the other. The choices must be made in ignorance of what the other will do they are kept in separate cells. The possible pay-offs are given in table 1. It can be seen that, whatever choice the other may make, each player considered singly gains a higher pay-off by choosing to defect if the other cooperates, defection earns 5 points rather than 3; if the other defects, defection earns 1 point rather than 0.

So the only rational course is to defect. But this is not the best out- come for either, since, whereas mutual defection earns 1 point each, mutual cooperation would have earned both of them 3 points. So the individually rational choice turns out to deliver a mutual lose—lose outcome.

But if both could communicate and agree to go for mutual cooperation, how can each guarantee that the other will not subsequently defect, tempted by the 5 point prize?

In this kind of social trap, self-interested parties can readily get stuck at lose—lose outcomes. The trap depends on the game being played only once. If each move is part of a sequence of repeated games, there are possibilities for cooperative behaviour to evolve. Tit-for-Tat is not a pushover.

It hits back when the other defects. All key stake- holders must be persuaded that existing strategies lead to a lose—lose impasse and that preferable alternatives are available and will be to their advantage. Remaining irreconcilable spoilers must simply be defeated. So taking account of the future relationship for example, between two com- munities who will have to live together is one way out of the trap. Another is to take the social context into account.

Imagine, for example, that the prison- ers know that there is an agency outside which will punish them if they defect and reward them if they cooperate. This can change their pay-offs and hence the outcome. Positions, interests and needs How can the parties reframe their positions if they are diametrically opposed, as they often are? For example, Egypt and Israel quarrel over Sinai. Each claims sov- ereignty and their positions seem incompatible.

So the political space is found for what came to be the Camp David settlement. Interests are often easier to reconcile than positions, since there are usually several positions that might satisfy them. Some analysts take this to the limit by identifying basic human needs for example, identity, security, survival as lying at the roots of other motives. Basic human needs are seen to be generic and non-negotiable. But the hopeful argument of these analysts is that, whereas interests may be subject to relative scarcity, basic needs are not for example, security for one party is reinforced by security for the other.

This intervention may dampen the feedback spiral. Nye concludes that soft power is more important, even from a self-interested perspective, than many unreconstructed realists may suppose. Third parties such as politicians and governments may use all these forms of power. So there are no win—win outcomes, and the third party has to join forces with the underdog to bring about a resolution.

It is oppressive to be an oppressor, even if not so oppressive as to be oppressed. There are costs for the top dogs in sustaining themselves in power and keeping the underdogs down. The role of the third party is to assist with this transformation, if necessary confronting the top dog. This means transforming what were unpeaceful, unbalanced relationships into peaceful and dynamic ones. There are many ways in which this can be approached without using coercion. Then there are the tactics of mobilizing popular move- ments, increasing solidarity, making demonstrations of resolve, establishing a demand for change.

The unequal power structure is unbalanced and is held up by props of various kinds; remov- ing the props may make the unbalanced structure collapse. Another tactic is to strengthen and empower the underdogs. The underdogs may withdraw from the unbalanced relationship and start building anew — the parallel institutions approach.

Non-violence uses soft power to move towards a more balanced relationship. But this is not the only path. In response, there has been a differentiation and broadening in the scope of third-party intervention. Encarnacion et al. This is discussed further in chapter 14 pp.

Exchange and threat power dominate Track II: Good offices, conciliation, pure mediation, problem-solving.